Letters . . .

An Army Message . . . From the Sea

To the Editor— As the only Army officer deployed with an amphibious ready group (ARG), I participated in the first "workups" by the Navy for deployment (on the west coast) of an ARG and a carrier battle group (CVBG). One of my duties was preparing the daily air tasking order (ATO) as the helicopter coordinator for an embarked tactical air control squadron (TACRON) detachment. To put it mildly, it was interesting to write a Navy-Marine air schedule. The highlight was a six-month deployment aboard *USS Peleliu* for operations that included Continue Hope and Quickdraw off Somalia as well as Distant Runner, a noncombatant evacuation operation in Burundi.

As a team the CVBG and ARG have an awesome amount of firepower. They can provide a quick-reaction, one-two punch in remote trouble spots around the world. CVBGs and ARGs did not typically work together in the past because the former focused on fighting the Russians in open-ocean nuclear war and the latter conducted training and deployments separately. As with any new doctrine or concept, there are challenges to overcome. It was interesting to observe the Navy leadership wrestling with command and control issues. Who is the supported and who is the supporting commander? How is the composite warfare command structure modified and will it change once command and control of the operation is phased ashore? Many of the same issues and struggles are encountered in integrating service capabilities through a joint task force (JTF).

Interoperability between the carrier Navy and the amphibious Navy is an evolving process. By the end of our workups we had a superior fighting force and follow-on CVBG/ARG teams are getting better. As a member of a TACRON, I learned the synergy of bringing a carrier air wing to the amphibious fight. With submarine and air threats, an ARG simply cannot go into battle alone. The CVBG/ARG team is a lethal package that can rapidly project combat power ashore and defeat the enemy below the surface, on the surface, and in the air.

—Major Paul R. Disney, USA
TACRON 11
Naval Air Base, Coronado

Corps Business

To the Editor— I am writing with regard to Richard Hooker's article, "America's Two Armies," which appeared in *JFQ* (Autumn/Winter 1994–95). My dissatisfaction with this fundamentally distorted article starts with the thesis that: "We have two services which see their core business as sustained land operations." The Marine Corps has a legislated mission and force structure that is distinct from the Army's. Built into its legislatively-mandated role is the requirement for a combined arms force composed of *both* air *and* ground components to engage in, seize, and defend advanced naval bases incident to prosecuting a naval campaign. The capabilities needed to execute these tasks, such as artillery or tanks, might lead the uninformed to think there is a deliberate attempt to build redundant forces. These capabilities and systems are consistent with the mandated role and function of the Marines and are not intended to compete with the Army. It is difficult to envision that the Corps with only 271 tanks poses a threat to the Army's 7,000 tanks and 20,000 armored vehicles. In short, the Marine Corps *is not* in the business of sustained land operations nor does it see itself as such.

The business of the Marines as defined by Congress in the aftermath of the Korean conflict arose from the need for a force-in-readiness that is highly mobile, constantly ready, and applicable across a broad spectrum of possible contingencies "to prevent potential conflagrations and to hold full-scale aggression at bay while the American Nation mobilizes." In creating a force to suppress international disturbances, it was determined that a balanced, combined arms team in a high state of readiness was required.

From this strategic assessment and design, Hooker finds a "propensity of the Marine Corps to wage sustained land combat." It is true that the Corps provided forces for World War I and II as well as Korea and Vietnam. Much of this combat was fought on land, and for sustained periods. But the reason such forces were ordered into action and operated for extended periods is more a function of their initial use in crisis response and the lack of preparedness.

If there is a propensity it is an expectation by the National Command Authorities for prompt and exacting mission execution. This performance, whether in crises requiring a delicate balance of political actions and military force or in full expeditionary warfare with ground and air forces, has been a standard of excellence which our national leaders expect as a byproduct of the particular role and function of the Marine Corps.

Contrary to Hooker's assertion, the Army, by either law or custom, *does not* exist "to win the Nation's wars." Historically, the Army has failed to meet the initial test of combat. By law, the Army conducts prompt, sustained land combat, generally as part of a joint or combined force. By custom, all services contribute to joint operations in successfully prosecuting war. By custom and law, one service is expected to be at a very high state of readiness to prevent or contain such conflicts.

—Frank G. Hoffman
Committee on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces

To the Editor— I compliment the authors of two articles which were published in the Autumn/Winter 1994–95 issue of your journal, Richard Hooker for "America's Two Armies" and Thomas Linn and C.P. Neimeyer for "Once and Future Marines." Yet while their arguments are well put, both articles contain a number of flaws and, thus, cannot be considered as definitive.

For instance, while Hooker presents a reasoned case on why the Marines should revert to being the Nation's amphibious force, he fails to consider whether the modernized tanks and MLRS requested by the Corps will be required for amphibious assaults in the 21st century. In addition, he does not acknowledge that the law stipulates that the Marine Corps should perform other tasks *as directed* by the President. While that may mean that the Marines should take on sustained land combat or expeditionary missions, it casts doubt on the extent to which the law allows them to perform what some regard as "Army missions."

Linn and Neimeyer see the Marines as the Nation's expeditionary force, but their argument is supported by many undocumented quotes which suggests the quotes may be taken out of context. The more subtle assertion that the Corps represents the American way of war while the Army has forgotten its roots is inaccurate, unfair, and irrelevant—particularly when roles and functions are the real issue. The argument is weakest in claiming that the Marines always have been intended to be an expeditionary force and basing that claim almost exclusively on statements by former Commandants, Secretaries of the Navy, et al. That the Marines should be the Nation's expeditionary force—since they historically define themselves as such—eludes all logic.

Regardless, both articles inform debate on the complementary nature of service capabilities.

—LTC Robert E. Johnson, USA
Springfield, Virginia

Tales Out of School

To the Editor— I can't imagine a more sure-fire way of ruining Professional Military Education (PME) than by adopting the main proposal offered by Robert Kupiszewski in "Joint Education for the 21st Century" (see Out of Joint, *JFQ*, Spring 1995). "I propose," the author states, "forming a joint command to oversee every aspect of education . . . . " If one's aim is to fertilize arrogance, nurture dogma, and instill *perfect knowledge*, then no surer path to its accomplishment could be envisioned.

Congress was well aware of that danger in crafting the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It did not, as the article contends, "[place] responsibility for PME under the Chairman" as a "major step toward unity of command . . . . " What the law did do was assign CJCS "coordinating authority" for education policy. All of us who have been in the joint community for any length of time know the precise difference between that authority and other forms of command. The law states that the Chairman shall be responsible for "formulating *policies for coordinating* the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces [emphasis added]." CJCS can write policies to ensure that the services properly coordinate the training and education of their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. And, by the bye, the Secretary of Defense had better sign these coordinating policies if they are to be followed since, as the law states, *the Chairman is not in the chain of command*.

More importantly, competition, diversity of opinion, multiple approaches, and broad fields of investigation—all of which sound very American, very market-oriented, and very characteristic of the unique strengths of our Nation—constitute the essence of good education, inside or outside the military. Imagine putting the president of Harvard in charge of all the engineering schools in the country and then expecting in ten years to find a single competent engineer in the United States. Picture that scenario and you have the major defect in the article's formula for future education in the Armed Forces. Consolidation does not produce "the same level of excellence"; rather it will guarantee the same level of mediocrity. And the saints preserve us if training is to be placed under the same czar which Kupiszewski seems to be suggesting. Education and training are like Mozart and cordite: normally they are not mixed since their purposes are antithetical.

—COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA
Deputy Director
Marine Corps War College

To the Editor— Robert Kupiszewski's article covers a range of PME issues and offers some far-reaching, even revolutionary proposals. Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act the Armed Forces have made steady progress in integrating jointness into education, training, and operations. *JFQ* itself symbolizes the emergence of joint culture.

The Chairman is responsible for coordinating education by law. Cooperation between the joint community and services has significantly improved the quality and scope of joint education and, since 1991, service war and staff colleges have been accredited by CJCS to provide joint education.

Beside improving current education, attention has been given to the year 2000 and beyond. In October 1994, CJCS named a panel of cross-functional, flag-level representatives to review the PME system and its ability to prepare joint warfighters in the future. The panel concluded that the commitment to joint matters has continued to evolve since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted into law.

Joint acculturation is occurring among members of the Armed Forces earlier in their careers because of increased emphasis on joint training and exercises. As a result officers arrive at staff colleges with a greater appreciation of other services which enhances the joint environment that is so vital to learning. The panel also recommended that the PME framework be expanded to include every level—viz., precommissioning, primary, intermediate, and senior—and that certified resident intermediate and senior education be designed to fulfill educational requirements for Joint Specialty Officers to prepare them for joint assignments immediately upon graduation from a joint or service PME institution.

Jointness is not a panacea. Efforts to inculcate jointness into training, education, and operations should not lose sight of the primary importance of proficiency in the roles and missions of one's own service. The balance between joint and service education is paramount to organizing educational oversight bodies. Efficiencies can be gained by consolidating and collocating colleges and headquarters, but at what cost? Furthermore, creating greater capacity at colleges would not necessarily result in more officers being educated, because only a finite number of officers can attend college and satisfy other mission requirements.

—Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF
Deputy Director, Joint Staff,
for Military Education

Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye

To the Editor— As an Air Force officer assigned to CENTCOM, I read "Global Presence" (see *JFQ*, Spring 1995), the new Air Force white paper, with interest. It is incomplete and appears to be an extension of the strategic bomber versus carrier battle group debate. My views on presence have been shaped by the unique situation faced by CENTCOM. The command is located 7,000 nautical miles from its AOR, with relatively few permanently assigned or forward based forces, in a volatile region where the United States has vital national interests.

As "Global Presence" notes, presence is situational, and there is consequently no single, universally correct type of presence forces required. That said, the white paper does not discuss key aspects of military presence. The utility of presence, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. What's missing? Certainly visibility, lethality, and nonmilitary dimensions of presence warrant more consideration. Presence serves at least two objectives which are critical to regional stability: as a deterrent to would-be aggressors (and early defensive force if deterrence fails) and as a means of access—a foot in the door to support various national interests beyond military crisis response.

For a force to be a deterrent it must be seen as a credible threat to hostile acts by a potential enemy. The perceptions of credibility to a target audience (friend or foe) is at the heart of forward presence. To a sophisticated foe, vulnerable to long-range strategic attack, it may be sufficient to periodically move forces into its radar/sensor coverage. It becomes evident that the United States is there, concerned and capable. To other audiences, over-the-horizon/low visibility or occasional presence may be less threatening to foes and less reassuring to friends.

In addition to visibility, lethality of forward presence forces is key to deterrence as well as essential during initial defense. This is particularly true when attempting to delay/disrupt an attack, buy time to deploy, and bring to bear adequate force capability for decisive defeat of an aggressor. Again, this is threat/target dependent. A flyover of B–2s in Somalia would not have been nearly as effective as a deterrent/response capability as an amphibious ready group steaming over the horizon with the appearance of AC–130s and helicopter gunships.

Credible forward presence, as a symbol of commitment to allies and friends, is at the heart of access and future international cooperative efforts whether they be economic or collective crisis response. In an era of declining forces, there is a high probability that operations in the

future will be multinational. Seeds of collective security are planted by forward presence forces that nurture military-to-military relationships. Bilateral and multilateral relations, in turn, are built on a history of cooperation in exercises, security assistance, etc., which depend on forward deployed forces.

Air Force strategic forces have significant presence value, but not universally and not to the exclusion of other force packages. These force packages should be handcrafted—designed for the appropriate level of visibility and lethality—to send the intended message of deterrence/reassurance that best supports the theater strategy. Let's be joint.

—Col Ronald E. Dietz, USAF
Chief, Policy and Strategy
CENTCOM

Augmenting the JFACC

To the Editor—Maj Gen Hurley is right on target in "JFACC—Taking the Next Step" (*JFQ*, Spring 1995) when he identifies the need for a trained cadre on the CINC's air component staff. In this regard I suggest we are overlooking a potential source of trained cadres or augmentation staffs—the Reserves.

Dedicated Reserve staffs could be trained and prepared to mobilize or deploy in keeping with current continued readiness. They could augment exercise JFACC staffs during annual training and drill with their component air command and control agencies. Moreover they could drill with agencies of other services to further enhance their knowledge and skills.

Such staffs need not be service specific. Consideration should be given to forming joint Reserve individual mobilization augmentee detachments at the headquarters of every warfighting CINC. The Reserve forces have proven that they can perform professionally and efficiently in responding to crises. A JFACC augmentation staff mission seems almost made to order.

—Col Steven C. Morgan, USMCR
Commanding Officer
Reserve Support Unit
MCABWEST El Toro

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Engineering Blinders

To the Editor— I thank Chris Golden for his comments (see "From the Field and Fleet," *JFQ*, Spring 1995) on my article, "Software Warfare: The Militarization of Logic," which appeared in the Summer 1994 issue of *JFQ*. Nobody is suggesting modifying code *on the fly* in the battlefield. Software adaptability—logical mobility—comes in many ways, of which the user-screen interface, artificial intelligence, and code modifications are just some of the options. Software complexity is indeed inevitable, however you define it, which is why we need overarching doctrine to guide us through the maze. But my article was about the big picture, not engineering detail—an attempt to trigger a realization that software is the powerhouse of the Revolution in Military Affairs. It is to this wider horizon that I would encourage my engineering colleagues to lift their gaze. More than ever it is necessary for software engineers to recognize the power of what they create at the keyboard and to become fully engaged in current operational debates. They must realize that they are participants in a grand process of change every bit as important as that triggered by mechanization and electronics. That is the real meaning of software warfare—it delineates the new era of warfare. Software engineers will be needed in future war and the wider their perception of what is going on operationally, the greater will be the demand for their talents. But they must be prepared to think sideways and for major changes in the business of software production.

The costs of software production on overstretched budgets are already staggering and the engineering-oriented approach to solving the crisis has got us nowhere. Look at the ever-growing list of project failures in which software is cited as the principal cause (further spectacular failures are on the way). The West is busy procuring fighter aircraft so technologically "advanced" that can hardly be flown. The time is long overdue to ask—what's it doing for us and how about getting some economy of effort out of software? Remove the engineering blinders that condemn software to the domain of "experts." There's no such thing in this game. Bring principles of war to bear on the problem. At present the focus is on information. But information has always been critical—as much to the Romans as to us. Information does not underpin the RMA; what has really changed is the ability to process information—using software—and to apply it at the sharp end with weaponry that is also under software control. Increasingly battlefield information and weapons can be linked directly in an automated loop. The trick is how to do this with maximum speed, effectiveness, and flexibility. That is the key to understanding the future of war. If we get the basic thinking about the possibilities of 1990s warfare clear as Guderian did in the 1930s, it is but a few doctrinal steps to having control over the real motor of the RMA.

—Sqn Ldr Peter C. Emmett, RAF
Defence Research Agency
Ministry of Defence

Wargaming and *Stimulation*

To the Editor— I was gratified to see that my article on the "Future Directions for Wargaming" generated the three thoughtful letters in your last issue (see "The Fog of Wargaming," *JFQ*, Spring 1995, pp. 102–03). Such interesting comments deserve a response.

First, an apology to CDR M.K. Murray. Painting with a broad brush frequently spatters the innocent. I have a deep and abiding respect for Naval War College's long history of resisting the siren song of sexy new technology. Its effort to remain true to that tradition while aggressively attacking the problems of the future is an object lesson for every DOD wargaming activity.

William Cooper points out inherent tensions in using gaming to train operators on systems and procedures. If indeed the intent of BFTT precludes controllers from allowing the fog of war to "fall too thickly" because "the result would be incorrect and invalid operational training," then some other means of educating players about real world effects of mistakes and uncertainties must be found. But I am puzzled over how a realistic fog of war could ever be incorrect and invalid.

Finally, Edward Marks maintains that PKO games "teach the wrong lessons." Games do not teach, they help players learn. Improperly designed games, managed and controlled primarily to *play* the game ("in a rush to deploy the 'big battalions'") almost always lead down the garden path to a proverbial dung heap of false lessons. If you buy the scenario, you buy the farm. But the fault is not with gaming. It is *not* the case that "wargaming is inappropriate to multinational operations." The Dutch have been using gaming since 1992 to explore political-military issues. No, the problem lies not in wargames but in how gamers apply them. If you must distort reality to either meet an arbitrary "training imperative" or fall "into step with approved doctrine," then it is time to reexamine your training and doctrine.

—Peter P. Perla
Center for Naval Analyses